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ABSTRACT This paper proposes an improved steganalytic method when cover selection is used in
steganography. We observed that the covers selected by existing cover selection methods normally have
different characteristics from normal ones, and propose a steganalytic method to capture such differences.
As a result, the detection accuracy of steganalysis is increased. In our method, we consider a number
of images collected from one or more target (suspected but not known) users, and use an unsupervised
learning algorithm such as k-means to adapt the performance of a pre-trained classifier towards the cover
selection operation of the target user(s). The adaptation is done via pseudo-labels from the suspected images
themselves, thus allowing the re-trained classifier more aligned with the cover selection operation of the
target user(s). We give experimental results to show that our method can indeed help increase the detection
accuracy, especially when the percentage of stego images is between 0.3 and 0.7.
INDEX TERMS Cover selection, steganography, steganalysis, clustering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is the art of covert communication, aiming to
transmit data secretly through public channels without draw-
ing suspicion, and steganalysis aims to disclose the secret
transmission by analyzing suspected media [1].
Modern steganalytic methods use supervised machine
learning to investigate the models of the covers and the
stegos. Features are extracted from a set of images to train
a common steganalytic classifier, which is then used to
distinguish real stego images from normal (cover) images
without any hidden information [2], [3]. The ensemble
classifier [4] is widely used to enhance the performance
by using multiple classifiers. The feature extraction and
machine learning based steganalysis has been proved to
be efficient.
The most popular feature set is SRM (Spatial Rich
Model) [5], which are the fourth order co-occurrence matri-
ces for describing the dependencies among different pixels.
After SRM, some improved feature extraction methods are
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Chaker Larabi .
proposed [6], [7]. In PSRM (Projections of Spatial Rich
Model) [6], neighboring residual samples are projected onto
a set of random vectors and the histograms of the projections
are taken as the feature. The feature set maxSRMd2 [7] is
a variant of SRM that makes use of the modification prob-
abilities of cover elements during data embedding, which is
called probabilistic selection channel. Recently, deep learning
based steganalysis has also achieved good performances with
enough training data [8]–[10].
To resist steganalysis, in modern steganography, the addi-
tive distortion between the cover and the stego needs mini-
mizing to leave minimum statistical traces. One way of doing
this is to use the syndrome trellis coding (STC) [11] with
a user-defined distortion function, e.g., SUNIWARD [12],
WOW [13], HILL [14] for spatial images, and JUNI-
WARD [12], UED [15], UERD [16], HDS [17] for JPEG
images. In addition, the security performance can be signifi-
cantly improved by the selection of the cover when there are
a number of candidate images available to the user, as shown
in Fig. 1. In this case, the most suitable images can be
selected to minimize the detectability of the hidden infor-
mation. Researchers have proposed many methods for cover
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FIGURE 1. Cover selection based steganography.
FIGURE 2. Residual values of the [25] selected and arbitrarily selected
images.
selection [18]–[25]. The cover selection step is normally not
considered in modern steganalysis methods, which explains
why cover selection methods can help reduce detectability.
However, if we consider the user behavior in cover selection
into the steganalysis process, it may be possible to exploit
some cover selection methods for improving performance of
steganalysis.
Our proposed steganalytic method is based on the observa-
tion that covers selected for hiding information normally have
different characteristics from normal ones (shown in Fig. 2),
and such differences can be captured by a simple unsuper-
vised clustering algorithm such as k-means. We assume that
the image source of the user of steganographer is different
with that of the steganalyst. This assumption is reasonable
since the available images of steganographer and steganalyst
are different. Some steganalytic methods focus on decreasing
the drop in detection accuracy caused by image source mis-
match [26]–[29], but these methods do not consider the cover
selection operation for steganalysis. Based on this assump-
tion, we can use a clustering algorithm to help re-train a
machine learning based classifier to adapt to the cover selec-
tion operation of the target suspected user(s). The re-training
is done via pseudo-labels derived from the predicted labels
of the pre-trained classifier and those from the clustering
algorithm, which are used to get new pseudo-training sam-
ples for improving the detectability. Our experimental results
showed an improved detectability of the proposed stegan-
alytic method. The reason why this worked is because the
re-training process based on pseudo-labels can help reduce
the mismatch of image sources between the user of steganog-
raphy and the steganalyst, which is essentially an adaptation
to the cover selection operation of the target user(s).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section introduces some related work. Our proposed method
is explained in detail in Section III. Experimental results of
the proposed method are given in Section IV. The last section
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, some related work about the use of cover
selection in steganography is introduced firstly. Then the dif-
ferences between our method and some similar steganalytic
methods are clarified.
Most of current cover selection methods select cover
images empirically [18]–[22]. In [18], a cover selection
method is proposed for JPEG steganography. Firstly, the coef-
ficients which will be utilized by the embedding process
(called changeable DCT coefficients) are counted. Then the
images with a larger number of changeable DCT coefficients
and higher quality factor are selected as covers for secret data
carrying. In [19], the JPEG images with high visual quality
(such as high quality factor) are regarded as suitable covers
for embedding. The authors suggested that the images with
poor quality not only negatively affect the capacity but also
provoke special attention.
For uncompressed image, suitable images are selected
according to image texture and complexity [20]–[22], since
images with higher complexity have more details and human
vision system is less capable to detect minor modifications.
In [20], the secret information is also an image. The blocks of
secret image are compared with the blocks of cover images,
and then the images with most similar blocks to those of
the secret image are selected as covers. Where the simi-
larity of blocks is evaluated by the mean, variance, skew-
ness of 2×2 sub-blocks, and the neighborhood information.
In [21], image complexity is measured by visual quality
(such as PSNR) and amount of changes on a stego-image
since smaller amount of changes means higher visual quality
and lower steganalysis detectability. Then the images with
more complex texture are preferentially selected. The authors
of [22] proposed to use spatial information which calculated
from image residuals to measure image complexity. The spa-
tial information based image complexity is modelled by fuzzy
logic which finds the images that yield least detectable stego
image.
In [23], the relationship between image characteristics
(variance, complexity, entropy, histogram and function of
histogram) and steganography performance (relative entropy
and change of histogram) are explored, and then the images
withmild histogram are regarded as suitable covers. A unified
measure to evaluate the hiding ability of a cover image is
proposed in [24] based on Fisher Information Matrix and
Gaussian Mixture Model. Cover images are represented by
the Gaussian mixture model firstly. Then the Fisher Informa-
tion Matrix of cover image is calculated and mapped into a
real value to evaluate the hiding ability. But the employed
model is not able to describe natural image precisely. In [25],
the first-order derivative of steganographic distortion of a
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single cover is proved monotonically increasing with the
value of payload increasing. In addition, it is proved that first-
order derivative of steganographic distortion of covers that
selected from a given set should be equal. Based on the deduc-
tions, the imageswithminimal total steganographic distortion
are selected as covers, which results in high undetectability of
steganography.
As a general approach, cover selection has a theoretical
flaw that selected cover images (as a subset of all possible
images) will always have some statistical properties differ-
ent from the whole set of all possible images [30], [31].
The flaw will be shown in Section III-A. This would lead
to the development of steganalysis methods that can break
any cover selection methods. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no publicly reported work about steganal-
ysis against cover selection based steganography. Therefore,
it remains unknown how the theoretical flaw can lead to
practical attacks. The above-mentioned flaw also exists in
some coverless and cover-generation based steganographic
methods [32]–[34]. In these methods, the cover image is
generated instead of using existing images. This generation
should also in principle lead to different statistical properties
from other existing images. Therefore, it is possible that
our method can be extended to attack coverless and cover-
generation based steganographic methods.
As a similar kind of steganalysis, pooled stegan-
alysis [35]–[39] aims to group a set of clues in order to
detect the use of embedding. Some pooled steganalytic
methods [35], [36], [38] assumed that the steganalyst is
monitoring a number of users, with multiple innocent users
and some potentially genuine users. To determine who are the
genuine users, it is assume that their behaviors significantly
deviate from the majority of innocent users. Based on this
assumption, the genuine users can be recognized by unsu-
pervised clustering algorithms. Other pooled steganalytic
methods [37], [39] consider the scenario with only one user
and with the use of a single image dectector, also aims to find
the users of steganography.
Different from these pooled steganalytic methods which
work at the user level, our proposed behavioral steganalysis
focus on the image level, which aims to find the stego-images
among a number of clear images.With no doubt, the detection
results on images made by our method can also contribute to
the detection at the user level.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we demonstrate the distribution separation of
existing cover-selection methods firstly, and then propose our
steganalytic method to capture this separation.
A. DISTRIBUTION SEPARATION
OF COVER SELECTION
As mentioned in Section II, the statistical properties of
selected cover images are different from other images that
are not selected. To demonstrate this distribution separa-
tion, we conducted a group of experiments over the image
FIGURE 3. Demonstration of images (a)∼(d) selected by the method
in [25], and images (e)∼(h) selected arbitrarily.
dataset BOSSbase ver. 1.01. We selected 1,000 images from
BOSSbase ver. 1.01 using the method in [25], then calculated
the average value R of horizontal and vertical residual of each
image, defined by Eq. (1), where x(i, j) is the (i, j)-th pixel
value of an image sizedM × N . For comparison, another set
of 1,000 images were randomly selected from BOSSbase ver.













|x(i, j)− x(i+ 1, j)|
 (1)
The comparison of residual values between the selected
cover images with the arbitrary images is shown in Fig. 2.
It can be seen that the residual distribution of the images
selected by [25] is clearly different from the distribution
of the set of all possible images. As a general tendency,
the images selected by [25] contain larger residual values
(i.e., more complex texture), as shown in Fig. 3, therefore the
modification traces made by steganography can be concealed
effectively. While the larger residual values are beneficial for
embedding, the different statistical properties of the selected
cover images can also lead to new risks of steganalysis. This
flaw also exists in other cover selection methods, which has
been verified in some other related work [30], [31]. There-
fore, this statistical abnormality is a universal phenomenon
of cover selection methods. As a result, it can be employed
by steganalysis, which will be demonstrated in this paper.
To measure the statistical abnormality, other metrics can be
employed, e.g., deflection coefficient [40]. In this paper,
we do not calculate the statistical abnormality accurately,
since the statistical abnormality can be observed clearly
in Fig. 2.
B. PROPOSED STEGANALYTIC METHOD
In this paper, we provide experimental evidence of a prac-
tical and effective steganalysis on a specific cover selec-
tion method, but the idea could be extended to break other
cover selection methods without any change. Our proposed
168916 VOLUME 7, 2019
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steganalysis works by capturing the expected statistical dif-
ferences by an unsupervised clustering algorithm such as
k-means, given a set of images from one or more suspected
users of a cover selection based steganographic system. The
clustering algorithm helps re-train a machine learning based
steganalytic classifier so that the latter can adapt to the cover
selection behavior of the target user(s). The actual effect of
the re-training is to reduce the mismatch between the image
sources of the target user(s) and those of the steganalyst,
therefore increasing the detection accuracy of the re-trained
classifier.
Before explaining the proposed method in greater detail,
let us clarify the scenarios. First, the steganalyst uses a set
of his own images (e.g., a standard test image database) as
the training set to obtain a base-line classifier. Subsequently,
the steganalyst collects a number of images from one or more
users, some of whom are suspected to be using steganography
to hide secret information in some of the collected images.
The task of the steganalyst is to detect which images in the
collected set are stegos. We assume some cover selection
method is used by the user(s) of steganography to make
steganalysis harder.
The images collected are marked ‘‘clear’’ or ‘‘stego’’ by
the base-line classifier and marked ‘‘class 1’’ or ‘‘class 2’’
by a clustering algorithm (we use the popular k-means algo-
rithm as an example, other alternatives can also work). Based
on the assumption that the clustering algorithm can capture
some characteristics of the selected covers for steganography,
we hypothesize that either class 1 or 2 contains more stego
images. Based on this assumption and another one that the
base-line classifier performs relatively well (which is gen-
erally true for a good base-line classifier), we can combine
the two sets of labels to create new pseudo-labels for some
images, which can be used to re-train the base-line classifier
so that it can hopefully adapt itself more towards the genuine
cover selection behavior of the target user(s). The re-trained
classifier is used to re-classify all the images collected to
produce the final prediction labels. The re-training is done
separately for different sets of target images from the base-
line classifier. More details are given below.
Assume that n images are collected for detection,
which include k stego-images. Denote the n images by
{X1, . . . ,Xn}. After classified by the base-line classifier,
some images are marked as ‘‘clear’’, denoted by Xci ,
and the others are marked as ‘‘stego’’, denoted by Xsi ,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Similarly, some images are marked as
‘‘class 1’’ by the clustering algorithm, denoted by X(1)i , and
the other as ‘‘class 2’’, denoted by X(2)i . As shown in Fig. 4,
each image is marked with two labels. Our task now is to
refine the classification labels from the base-line classifier
based on the clustering based labels.
Denote images with labels ‘‘clear’’ and ‘‘class 1’’, ‘‘clear’’
and ‘‘class 2’’, ‘‘stego’’ and ‘‘class 1’’, ‘stego’’ and ‘‘class 2’’






i , respectively. Denote the corre-
sponding numbers of images with the four different sets of
FIGURE 4. Labels of images for detection.
FIGURE 5. Detectability w.r.t. the value of k/n when n = 10,000.
labels by γ c(1), γ c(2), γ s(1), γ s(2), respectively. It is clear that
γ c(1) + γ c(2) + γ s(1) + γ s(2) = n.
Based on these labels, we propose an image selection
strategy to identify images with potentially more reliable
pseudo-labels ‘‘clear’’ or ‘‘stego’’ for re-training the base-
line classifier towards the images collected, so that the
re-trained classifier can hopefully capture the specific char-
acteristics of the images under inspection, i.e., the cover
selection behavior of the target user(s). Note that the
new labels are pseudo-labels (i.e., no human efforts are
involved), so applying the re-trained classifier to those images
used in the re-training process does not involve circular
reasoning.
The main idea behind the image selection strategy is the
following: when the base-line classifier and the clustering
algorithm make the same judgment, the labels they agree are
likely more reliable and can capture the characteristics of the
stego and normal images for the specific collection better than
the standard training database the steganalyst originally used
to train the base-line classifier. Since the clustering algorithm
does not produce ‘‘stego’’ and ‘‘clear’’ labels, we consider
the majority labels in ‘‘class 1’’ and ‘‘class 2’’ as agreed
labels if the two clustering-based classes contain different
majority labels (i.e., one contains more ‘‘stego’’ labels and
the other contains more ‘‘clear’’ labels, or vice versa). The
above process can be formulated based on the following three
inequalities, where Inequality (3) checks the two clustering
based classes do contain different majority labels, and the
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FIGURE 6. Detection error comparisons between SRM, PSRM and the improved versions using the proposed steganalytic method
for n = 10,000 and k = 5,000 using SUNIWARD and WOW with (a) 0.2 bpp; (b) 0.3 bpp; (c) 0.4 bpp; (d) 0.5 bpp.
other two equations are the conditions corresponding to the
two different mappings from the clustering labels to the labels
of the base-line classifier. In detail, Xc(1)i and X
s(2)
i will be
added into the training samples if Inequality (4) is satisfied.
That means, there are more ‘‘clear’’ labels than ‘‘stego’’
labels in ‘‘class 1’’, so that the images with labels ‘‘clear’’
in ‘‘class 1’’ and the images with labels ‘‘stego’’ in ‘‘class 2’’
should be added into the training samples. On the contrary,
Xc(2)i and X
s(1)
i will be added into the training samples if
Inequality (4) is satisfied.
(γ c(1) − γ s(1))(γ c(2) − γ s(2)) < 0 (2)
γ c(1) > γ s(1) (3)
γ c(1) < γ s(1) (4)
The proposed image selection strategy for re-training the
base-line classifier can be summarized as Algorithm 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The image datasets employed in our experiments are
BOSSbase ver. 1.01 [41] that contains 10,000 uncompressed
grayscale images sized 512×512, and UCID [42] that con-
tains 1,338 uncompressed color images sized 512×384.
Algorithm 1 The Algorithm for Selecting Images With New
Pseudo-Labels.
Mark the images collected with labels ‘clear’’ or ‘‘stego’’
using the base-line classifier;
Mark the images collected with labels ‘‘class 1’’ or
‘‘class 2’’ using a clustering algorithm;
if Inequality (3)is satisfied then
if Inequality (4) is satisfied then
Add Xc(1)i and X
s(2)
i into the training samples;
break;
end if
if Inequality (4) is satisfied then
Add Xc(2)i and X
s(1)
i into the training samples;
end if
end if
The 1,338 images in UCID were transformed into grayscale
images, and then used to train the base-line classifier. The
10,000 images in BOSSbase ver. 1.01 were used to sample
different sets of images collected from suspected user(s)
(n ≤ 10, 000). In detail, n images are arbitrarily selected from
BOSSbase ver. 1.01 as the collected images for detection, and
then k images are selected from the obtained n images by
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FIGURE 7. Detection error comparisons between SRM, PSRM and the improved versions using the proposed steganalytic method
for n = 10,000 and k = 6,000 using SUNIWARD and WOW with (a) 0.2 bpp; (b) 0.3 bpp; (c) 0.4 bpp; (d) 0.5 bpp.
one of the existing cover selection methods for stego-images
production.
For steganography, the popular methods SUNIWARD [12]
and WOW [13] were used for embedding (to produce the
stego images of the steganographer). For cover selection,
the method in [25] was used to select the most suitable k
covers since it achieves high undetectability against modern
steganalysis.
For steganalysis, the popular feature extraction methods
SRM [5] and PSRM [6] are used as benchmark. We employ
the ensemble classifier proposed in [4] to measure the prop-
erty of feature sets. For the clustering algorithm, we use
k-means [43], one of the most used clustering methods.
The criterion of evaluating the performance of feature sets
is the minimal total error PE with identical priors achieved on








where PFA is the false alarm rate and PMD the missed detec-
tion rate. The performance is evaluated using the average of
PE over ten random tests. For each test, a random set of n
images were selected out of the 10,000 BOSSbase database
and k images out of the n ones were used as the covers.
Different values of n and k were tested to check the perfor-
mance under different scenarios.
B. DETECTABILITY
Since not all n images are stego images, the detectability
of steganalysis depends on the ratio of stego images (k/n).
The relationship between detectability and the value of k/n
is shown in Fig. 5, where stego images were obtained using
SUNIWARD with 0.5 bpp (bit per pixel) and WOW with
0.3 bpp, respectively. ‘‘PSRM-P’’ in the legend refers to
the proposed method with the re-trained classifier, while
‘‘PSRM’’ refers to the base-line classifier.
It can be seen that the advantage of the proposed method
becomes obvious when the value of k/n is between 0.3 and
0.7, and reaches the maximum around 0.6 and 0.7. On the
one hand, it is reasonable that a larger ratio of stego images
results in higher detectability, since the detectable trace made
by steganography is in proportion to the quantity of embed-
ded data. On the other hand, a larger ratio of stego images
results in more unbalance quantity between clear and stego
images when this ratio is larger than 0.5. This unbalance is
unfavourable to the proposed method which employs clus-
tering. Therefore, the optimal value of k/n for the proposed
method is larger than 0.5 but not close to 1.
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FIGURE 8. Detection errors for smaller image sets (n = 100 and n = 200).
The comparisons of detection error PE with feature sets
SRM, PSRM and the improved versions ‘‘SRM-P’’ and
‘‘PSRM-P’’ using the proposed method with k = 5,000 and
k = 6,000 are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively. The
results indicate that the detectability is improved after the pro-
posed method is employed. Specifically, with the proposed
method for k = 6,000, the PE of PSRM decreased by 19.68%
for SUNIWARDwith 0.4 bpp, 17.49% for SUNIWARDwith
0.5 bpp. For SRM, the PE decreased by 1.56% forWOWwith
0.4 bpp, and 5.45% for WOW with 0.5 bpp. For the cases of
k = 5,000, the PE of PSRM decreased by 16.83% for SUNI-
WARD with 0.4 bpp, 15.6% for SUNIWARD with 0.5 bpp.
For some cases, the PE has not decreased. This may be
caused by the conditions of the image selection algorithm
for producing re-training pseudo-labels. It is possible that
neither sets of conditions are satisfied so no re-training is
possible, therefore no improvement can be achieved. While
no improvement in this case, the re-training process does not
make the base-line classifier’s performance worse.
In real world, it may be difficult to obtain 10,000 images for
detection and the large ratio of stego images for a large image
set is rare. To verify the practicability of the proposed method
with smaller sets of images, we randomly chose 100 and
200 images fromBOSSbass ver. 1.01 to form two small image
sets (n = 100 and n = 200). The corresponding experimental
results are shown in Fig. 8, where the steganographic method
is SUNIWARD and the payload is 0.5 bpp. Since all the
results of PE are the average value of ten independent tests,
the variances of PE are also given in Table 1. It can be seen
that the fluctuation of PE is not large. From Fig. 8, we can see
that the detection error rate also decreases for small image
sets in most cases using the proposed method. Therefore,
the proposed method can be effective for smaller image sets,
which could allow closer inspection of one or a few target
user(s) who are use steganography actively (i.e., with a large
ratio of k/n).
We did not compare our method with the method
in [35]–[39] because the two kinds of steganalytic methods
work at different levels. The method in [35]–[39] aims to
TABLE 1. Variances (×10−3) of detection errors for smaller image sets
(n = 100 and n = 200).
recognize the users of steganography while ours aims to
recognize stego-images. In other words, our method focuses
on detecting the existence of the secret information within
images with the help of behavioral analysis (cover selection)
of users. We however plan to extend our method in future to
recognize users of steganography and then conduct a compar-
ison of its performance with that of the work in [35]–[39].
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new steganalytic method using a clus-
tering algorithm to improve the performance of a base-line
classifier. The improvement is achieved by re-training a base-
line classifier, which is pre-trained based on a standard image
database, towards the actual cover images used by the user of
the steganography. The re-training is done based on pseudo-
labels of images under inspection, so the re-trained classifier
is effectively more ‘‘contextualized’’ to perform better. Our
experimental results proved the proposed method worked
with even a smaller set of suspected images and a simple
clustering algorithm like k-means.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Fridrich, Steganography in Digital Media: Principles, Algorithms, and
Applications. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
[2] G. Feng, X. Zhang, Y. Ren, Z. Qian, and S. Li, ‘‘Diversity-based cascade
filters for JPEG steganalysis,’’ IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol.,
to be published.
[3] B. Li, Z. Li, S. Zhou, S. Tan, and X. Zhang, ‘‘New steganalytic features
for spatial image steganography based on derivative filters and thresh-
old LBP operator,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 13, no. 5,
pp. 1242–1257, May 2018.
[4] J. Kodovský, J. Fridrich, and V. Holub, ‘‘Ensemble classifiers for steganal-
ysis of digital media,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 2,
pp. 432–444, Apr. 2012.
[5] J. Fridrich and J. Kodovský, ‘‘Rich models for steganalysis of digital
images,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 868–882,
Jun. 2012.
[6] V. Holub and J. Fridrich, ‘‘Random projections of residuals for digital
image steganalysis,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 12,
pp. 1996–2006, Dec. 2013.
[7] T. Denemark, V. Sedighi, V. Holub, R. Cogranne, and J. Fridrich,
‘‘Selection-channel-aware rich model for steganalysis of digital images,’’
in Proc. IEEE Int. Workshop Inf. Forensics Secur., Dec. 2014, pp. 48–53.
[8] J. Ni, J. Ye, and Y. I. Yang, ‘‘Deep learning hierarchical representations for
image steganalysis,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 12 no. 11,
pp. 2545–2557, Nov. 2017.
[9] J. Zeng, S. Tan, B. Li, and J. Huang, ‘‘Large-scale JPEG image steganal-
ysis using hybrid deep-learning framework,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 1200–1214, May 2018.
168920 VOLUME 7, 2019
Z. Wang et al.: Towards Improved Steganalysis: When Cover Selection Is Used in Steganography
[10] M. Boroumand, M. Chen, and J. Fridrich, ‘‘Deep residual network for ste-
ganalysis of digital images,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 14,
no. 5, pp. 1181–1193, May 2018.
[11] T. Filler, J. Judas, and J. Fridrich, ‘‘Minimizing additive distortion in
steganography using syndrome-trellis codes,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 920–935, Sep. 2011.
[12] V. Holub, J. Fridrich, and T. Denemark, ‘‘Universal distortion function for
steganography in an arbitrary domain,’’ EURASIP J. Inf. Secur., vol. 2014,
p. 1, Dec. 2014.
[13] V. Holub and J. Fridrich, ‘‘Designing steganographic distortion using
directional filters,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Workshop Inf. Forensics Secur.,
Dec. 2012, pp. 234–239.
[14] B. Li, M. Wang, J. Huang, and X. Li, ‘‘A new cost function for spatial
image steganography,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Image Process., Oct. 2014,
pp. 4206–4210.
[15] L. Guo, J. Ni, and Y. Q. Shi, ‘‘Uniform embedding for efficient JPEG
steganography,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 9, no. 5,
pp. 814–825, May 2014.
[16] L. Guo, J. Ni, W. Su, C. Tang, and Y.-Q. Shi, ‘‘Using statistical
image model for JPEG steganography: Uniform embedding revisited,’’
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 10, no. 12, pp. 2669–2680,
Dec. 2015.
[17] Z. Wang, X. Zhang, and Z. Yin, ‘‘Hybrid distortion function for JPEG
steganography,’’ J. Electron. Imag., vol. 25, no. 5, 2016, Art. no.
050501.
[18] M. Kharrazi, H. T. Sencar, and N. Memon, ‘‘Cover selection for stegano-
graphic embedding,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Image Process., Oct. 2006,
pp. 117–120.
[19] O. Evsutin, A. Kokurina, and R. Meshcheryakov, ‘‘Approach to the selec-
tion of the best cover image for information embedding in JPEG images
based on the principles of the optimality,’’ J. Decis. Syst., vol. 27, no. S1,
pp. 256–264, Apr. 2018.
[20] H. Sajedi and M. Jamzad, ‘‘Cover selection steganography method based
on similarity of image blocks,’’ in Proc. IEEE 8th Int. Conf. Comput. Inf.
Technol. Workshops, Jul. 2008, pp. 379–384.
[21] H. Sajedi and M. Jamzad, ‘‘Using contourlet transform and cover selection
for secure steganography,’’ Int. J. Inf. Secur., vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 337–352,
Oct. 2010.
[22] M. S. Subhedar and V. H. Mankar, ‘‘Curvelet transform and cover selec-
tion for secure steganography,’’ Multimedia Tools Appl., vol. 77, no. 7,
pp. 8115–8138, Apr. 2018.
[23] R.-E. Yang, Z.-W. Zheng, andW. Jin, ‘‘Cover selection for image steganog-
raphy based on image characteristics,’’ J. Optoelectron. Laser, vol. 25,
pp. 764–768, Apr. 2014.
[24] S. Wu, Y. Liu, S. Zhong, and Y. Liu, ‘‘What makes the stego image unde-
tectable?’’ in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Internet Multimedia Comput. Service,
2015, Art. no. 47.
[25] Z. Wang, X. Zhang, and Z. Yin, ‘‘Joint cover-selection and payload-
allocation by steganographic distortion optimization,’’ IEEE Signal Pro-
cess. Lett., vol. 25, no. 10, pp. 1530–1534, Oct. 2018.
[26] I. Lubenko and A. D. Ker, ‘‘Steganalysis with mismatched covers: Do
simple classifiers help?’’ in Proc. 14th ACMWorkshop Multimedia Secur.,
2012, pp. 11–18.
[27] J. Kodovsky`, V. Sedighi, and J. Fridrich, ‘‘Study of cover source mismatch
in steganalysis and ways to mitigate its impact,’’ Proc. SPIE, vol. 9028,
Feb. 2014, Art. no. 90280J.
[28] J. Pasquet, S. Bringay, andM. Chaumont, ‘‘Steganalysis with cover-source
mismatch and a small learning database,’’ in Proc. 22nd Eur. Signal Pro-
cess. Conf., Sep. 2014, pp. 2425–2429.
[29] Z. Li and A. G. Bors, ‘‘Selection of robust features for the cover source
mismatch problem in 3D steganalysis,’’ in Proc. 23rd Int. Conf. Pattern
Recognit., Dec. 2016, pp. 4256–4261.
[30] S. Kouider, M. Chaumont, andW. Puech, ‘‘Technical points about adaptive
steganography by oracle (ASO),’’ in Proc. 20th Eur. Signal Process. Conf.,
Aug. 2012, pp. 1703–1707.
[31] Z. Wang and X. Zhang, ‘‘Secure cover selection for steganography,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 7, pp. 57857–57867, 2019.
[32] X. Zhang, F. Peng, and M. Long, ‘‘Robust coverless image steganography
based on DCT and LDA topic classification,’’ IEEE Trans. Multimedia,
vol. 20, no. 12, pp. 3223–3238, Dec. 2018.
[33] S. Li and X. Zhang, ‘‘Toward construction-based data hiding: From secrets
to fingerprint images,’’ IEEE Trans. Image Process., vol. 28, no. 3,
pp. 1482–1497, Mar. 2019.
[34] H. Shi, J. Dong, W. Wang, Y. Qian, and X. Zhang, ‘‘SSGAN: Secure
steganography based on generative adversarial networks,’’ in Proc. 18th
Pacific-Rim Conf. Multimedia. Harbin, China: Springer, Sep. 2017,
pp. 534–544.
[35] A. D. Ker and T. Pevný, ‘‘A new paradigm for steganalysis via clustering,’’
Proc. SPIE, vol. 7880, Feb. 2011, Art. no. 78800U.
[36] A. D. Ker and T. Pevný, ‘‘The steganographer is the outlier: Realistic
large-scale steganalysis,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 9, no. 9,
pp. 1424–1435, Sep. 2014.
[37] T. Pevny` and I. Nikolaev, ‘‘Optimizing pooling function for pooled ste-
ganalysis,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Workshop Inf. Forensics Secur. (WIFS),
Nov. 2015, pp. 1–6.
[38] F. Li, K. Wu, J. Lei, M. Wen, Z. Bi, and C. Gu, ‘‘Steganalysis over large-
scale social networks with high-order joint features and clustering ensem-
bles,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 344–357,
Feb. 2016.
[39] Z. Wang, Z. Qian, and X. Zhang, ‘‘Single actor pooled steganalysis,’’
in Proc. Int. Conf. Genetic Evol. Comput. Singapore: Springer, 2018,
pp. 339–347.
[40] V. Sedighi, R. Cogranne, and J. Fridrich, ‘‘Content-adaptive steganography
by minimizing statistical detectability,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secu-
rity, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 221–234, Feb. 2016.
[41] P. Bas, T. Filler, and T. Pevný, ‘‘‘Break our steganographic system’:
The ins and outs of organizing BOSS,’’ in Proc. 13th Int. Workshop Inf.
Hiding (IH). Prague, Czech Republic: Springer, May 2011, pp. 59–70.
[42] G. Schaefer and M. Stich, ‘‘UCID: An uncompressed color image
database,’’ Proc. SPIE, vol. 5307, pp. 472–481, Jan. 2003.
[43] T. Kanungo, D. M. Mount, N. S. Netanyahu, C. D. Piatko, R. Silverman,
and A. Y. Wu, ‘‘An efficient k-means clustering algorithm: Analysis and
implementation,’’ IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., vol. 24, no. 7,
pp. 881–892, Jul. 2002.
ZICHI WANG received the B.S. degree in elec-
tronics and information engineering and the
M.S. degree in signal and information process-
ing from Shanghai University, China, in 2014 and
2017, respectively, where he is currently pursuing
the Ph.D. degree. His research interests include
steganography, steganalysis, and reversible data
hiding. He has published about 30 articles in these
areas.
SHUJUN LI (M’08–SM’12) received the B.E.
degree in information science and engineering,
in 1997, and the Ph.D. degree in information and
communication engineering, in 2003, from Xi’an
Jiaotong University, China. Since November 2017,
he has been a Professor of cyber security with the
University of Kent, U.K., leading the university
wide Kent Interdisciplinary Research Centre in
Cyber Security (KirCCS), a U.K. government rec-
ognized Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber
Security Research (ACE-CSR). He has published over 100 scientific articles
with two Best Paper Awards. His research interests include cyber security,
human–computer interface, multimedia computing, digital forensics, and
cybercrime.
XINPENG ZHANG (M’11) received the B.S.
degree in computational mathematics from Jilin
University, China, in 1995, and the M.E. and
Ph.D. degrees in communication and informa-
tion system from Shanghai University, China,
in 2001 and 2004, respectively. Since 2004, he has
been with the faculty of the School of Com-
munication and Information Engineering, Shang-
hai University, where he is currently a Professor.
His research interests include information hiding,
image processing, and digital forensics. He has published over 200 articles
in these areas.
VOLUME 7, 2019 168921
